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Fuzzy trace theory explains why children do not have to use rules of logic or premise information
to infer transitive relationships. Instead, memory of the premises and performance on transitivity
tasks is explained by a verbatim ability and a gist ability. Until recently, the processes involved in
transitive reasoning and memory of the premises were studied by comparing mean performance in
fixed-age groups. In this study, an individual-difference model of fuzzy trace theory for transitive rea-
soning was formulated and tested on a sample (N = 409) of 4- to 13-year-old children. Tasks were
used which differed with respect to presentation ordering and position ordering. From this individ-
ual-difference model expectations could be derived about the individual performance on memory and
transitivity test-pairs.
The multilevel latent class model was used to fit the formalized individual-difference fuzzy trace
theory to the sample data. The model was shown to fit the data to a large extent. The results
showed that verbatim ability and gist ability drove the activation of verbatim and gist traces,
respectively, and that children used combinations of these traces to solve memory tasks (testing
memory of the premises) and transitivity tasks. Task format had a stronger effect on transitivity
task performance than on memory of the premises. Development of gist ability was found to
be faster than development of verbatim ability. Another important finding was that some children
remembered the premise information correctly but were not able to infer the transitive relation-
ship, even though the premises provided all the necessary information. This contradicts Trabasso’s
linear ordering theory which posits that memory of the premises is sufficient to infer transitive
relationships.
 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.0273-2297/$ - see front matter  2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.dr.2006.08.001
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General introduction
A transitive reasoning task requires the inference of an unknown relationship between two
objects from the known relationships between each of these objects and a third object. For
example, let three sticks, A, B, and C, differ in length, denoted as Y, such that YA > YB > YC;
then given YA > YB and YB > YC, the relationship between A and C can be inferred from
these two relationships. In this example, the pairs [A,B] and [B,C] are the premise pairs
and the relationships between the objects in the premise pairs constitute the premises.
A transitive reasoning task consists of a presentation stage and a test stage. At the pre-
sentation stage, the premise pairs are shown to the child. During the test stage, (s)he is
asked to infer the transitive relationship from the premises; in the example, YA > YC.
The object pair [A,C] is the transitivity test-pair, because it tests the ability to infer a tran-
sitive relationship from the premises. The premise pairs may also be shown to test whether
the child is able to remember the premises. When memory of the premises is tested, the
premise pairs—in this example [A,B] and [B,C]—are used as memory test-pairs.
According to Piaget (1947), children are capable of drawing transitive inferences when
they understand the necessity of using rules of logic. When children know how to use these
rules, they are able to solve any transitive relationship provided they can remember the
premises. This understanding of rules of logic is acquired at the concrete operational stage,
at approximately seven years of age. Then, for the first time children understand the
reversibility principle (Piaget, 1942, 1947). A transitive inference effectively demonstrates
this principle: When A is longer than B, the reversibility principle says that B must be
shorter than A; and when one knows that A is longer than B, and C is shorter than B,
one can use the reversibility principle to conclude that A is longer than C.
Children at the pre-operational stage—that is, at two to seven years of age (Piaget,
1947; see also Flavell, 1970)—do not yet understand the reversibility principle. Alterna-
tively, these children consider objects or characteristics of objects in a nominal way, that
is, not in relationship to other objects (Piaget, 1942). Due to this nominal thinking children
are not capable of performing internalized operations on objects and they do not under-
stand the necessity of using rules of logic. When a cue is provided about the ordering of the
objects in a task, an understanding of such rules of logic may not be necessary to solve the
task. For example, when all objects are presented simultaneously and when they are
ordered on the dimension on which they differ, the position of the objects can be used
for inferring their mutual relationships. Reasoning based on the use of cues is called func-
tional reasoning. Functional reasoning is typical of the pre-operational stage. Piaget used
transitive-reasoning tasks to study children’s understanding of operational reasoning
(Piaget, 1942; Piaget, Inhelder, & Szeminska, 1948).
According to Piaget’s theory, memory of the premises is a necessary condition to solve a
transitive relationship. Only when the premise information is available can children use the
rules of logic to draw the transitive inference. Braine (1959) showed that after the premises
had been learned children were able to draw transitive inferences at five years of age. He
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standing rules of logic. Smedslund (1963, 1965, 1969) argued that Braine’s results could be
explained by a labelling strategy (this is a strategy in which a nominal label of an object is
used to solve the task), but Trabasso and his colleagues (Riley, 1976; Riley & Trabasso,
1974; Trabasso & Riley, 1975; Trabasso, Riley, & Wilson, 1975) showed that four-year
old children were able to draw a transitive inference on the test-pair [B, D] in a 5-object
task (YA < YB < YC < YD < YE) in which they could not use the labelling strategy because
B and D had no unique labels.
Bryant and Trabasso (1971) extensively trained 4- to 7-year-old children to remember
the premises in a 5-object task, such as YA < YB < YC < YD < YE. On the basis of a series
of experiments (Riley, 1976; Riley & Trabasso, 1974; Trabasso & Riley, 1975; Trabasso
et al., 1975) Trabasso (1977) postulated his linear ordering theory (see also Bower,
1971), the basis of which is that children encode premises into an internal representation
of the complete series. During training, reaction times and patterns of errors showed that
children first learn the end-anchor premises of the series (i.e., YA < YB and YD < YE) and
then the premises in the middle (i.e., YB < YC, YC < YD). These findings agreed with both
the distance hypothesis and the end-anchored hypothesis (Potts, 1972). Trabasso and his
colleagues (Bryant & Trabasso, 1971; Trabasso, 1977; Trabasso et al., 1975) showed that
children only need to remember the premises for being able to form an internal represen-
tation of the linear ordering. They concluded that an understanding of rules of logic is not
necessary for transitive inference and that accurate memory of premises is sufficient for
correct transitive inference. However, in contrast with these results, Halford and Galloway
(1977), Grieve and Nesdale (1979) and Halford (1979) showed that children who remem-
bered the premises sometimes failed to draw the transitive inference.
Both Piaget’s and Trabasso’s theories assumed that memory of the premises was a nec-
essary condition for drawing correct inferences. This general agreement originated from
the finding that children who responded correctly to transitivity test-pairs often justified
their responses by restating the premises (Smedslund, 1963). Moreover, Trabasso and
his associates (e.g. Trabasso, 1977; Trabasso et al., 1975), Adams (1978), and Perner,
Steiner, and Staehelin (1981) showed that transitive inference was related to memory of
the premises. However, Brainerd and Kingma (1984, 1985, see also Brainerd and Reyna,
1992) concluded that memory of the premises is not a prerequisite for transitive reasoning.
Based on their own experiments and a re-analysis of studies by Halford and Galloway
(1977), Kingma (1981), and Russell (1981) they showed that the solution of memory
test-pairs and transitivity test-pairs are independent. Independence implies that the condi-
tional probability of drawing a correct transitive inference (denoted T) given memory for
the premises (denoted M), written as P(T ŒM), is equal to the probability of drawing a cor-
rect transitive inference irrespective of memory of the premisses, written as P(T); that is,
P(T ŒM) = P(T). Thus, two results are important here: children neither seemed to use rules
of logic nor did they have to remember the premises to infer a transitive relationship.
These findings contradicted both Piaget’s and Trabasso’s theory. Alternatively, Brainerd
and Kingma explained these results by means of fuzzy trace theory.
According to fuzzy trace theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 1993, 2004; Reyna & Brainerd,
1990, 1992, 1995a, 1995b), incoming information is encoded and reduced to the essence.
Representations of the same kind of information can be ordered by degree of exactness
according to a hierarchy of gist (Reyna & Brainerd, 1990, 1995a). The different levels at
which information is encoded are called traces. Traces that contain literal, well-articulated,
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Traces that contain fuzzy, reduced, pattern-like information only holding the gist are
called gist traces. Working memory holds both kinds of traces. Verbatim and gist traces
are processed in parallel; that is, incoming information is processed simultaneously at dif-
ferent trace levels. Because the information stored in verbatim traces is fine-grained, reten-
tion is shorter than that of gist traces which do not require much working-memory
capacity due to their impoverished structure (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995a).
Brainerd and Kingma (1984, 1985) and Brainerd and Reyna (1992; see also Reyna &
Brainerd, 1990) posit that there is a pervasive inclination to thinking, reasoning and
remembering by processing gist rather than verbatim traces. The mind picks up those
traces that are suited for accurate performance on the presented task. According to Bra-
inerd and Reyna (1990a; see also Brainerd & Reyna, 1990b) it is a natural habit of mind
to process gist traces instead of verbatim traces, because the former has advantages over
the latter with respect to trace availability, trace accessibility, trace malleability, and pro-
cessing complexity. Tailored to transitive reasoning this means that instead of using the
premises, more-global pattern information about the ordering of the objects is often suf-
ficient to infer the transitive relationship (Brainerd & Kingma, 1984). Thus, when con-
fronted with a 5-object task (e.g., YA < YB < YC < YD < YE) inference of the pattern
‘‘objects got smaller to the left’’ is enough to solve the transitivity test-pair [B,D]. This
pattern information is processed in a gist trace. For memory test-pairs [A,B], [B,C],
[C,D], and [D,E] children may use both verbatim and gist traces. That is, the premises
are stored in verbatim traces. However, whenever a gist trace is available containing pat-
tern information (e.g., ‘‘objects got smaller to the left’’) the memory test-pairs can also
be inferred from a gist trace.
Brainerd and Kingma (1984) hypothesized three models to explain the parallel func-
tioning of verbatim and gist traces. The unitary-trace model hypothesizes that, whenever
a gist trace holding pattern information is available, children use this gist trace to solve
both memory and transitivity test-pairs. The dual-trace model hypothesizes that children
use verbatim traces when they solve memory test-pairs and gist traces when they solve
transitivity test-pairs. The mixed-trace model hypothesizes that children solve memory
test-pairs by means of verbatim traces when still in storage. When such information is
not available anymore, they use gist traces.
Patterns of errors on memory test-pairs and transitivity test-pairs were analyzed to
determine which of the three models best explains the parallel functioning of verbatim
and gist traces. In agreement with Trabasso’s linear ordering theory, Brainerd and King-
ma (1984) showed that children performed better on the end-anchored test pairs of the
spatial ordering than on the test pairs in between. This spatial-position effect was found
both in the memory and transitivity test-pairs, suggesting that children used pattern
(i.e., gist) information for both kinds of tasks. For the memory test-pairs, performance
was the same irrespective of the order in which test pairs were presented. Thus, tempo-
ral-position effects, reflected by better performance on the premises presented first and last
than on the premises in between, were absent. This result agreed with the unitary-trace
model and disagreed with the mixed- and dual-trace models. Therefore, Brainerd and
Kingma (1984) concluded that, when available, children use gist traces to solve both the
memory and transitivity test-pairs.
For separate age groups, Brainerd and Kingma (1984) computed percentages of
correct answers for memory and transitivity test-pairs. These percentages suggested that
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traces, and that the unitary-trace model fitted the data best. Moreover, older age groups
on average showed better performance than younger age groups. However, by averaging
results over children of the same age much variance in task performance remained unex-
plained: Notice that a spatial-position effect that is found at the group level does not imply
a similar effect for each individual child. In fact, some children may indeed show a spatial-
position effect while other children do not perceive any pattern at all which results in poor
performance or, alternatively, they perceive the complete ordering which results in good
performance on all memory and transitivity test-pairs. Theoretically, it is even possible
that the average percentages-correct obscure that none of the individual children produced
the pattern of task scores typical of a spatial-position effect. Thus, a theory that explains
individual differences in task performance is badly needed.
Fuzzy trace theory offers a strong theoretical framework for explaining these individual
differences, because it predicts individual differences in performance due to differences in
the retrieval of verbatim and gist traces and the accuracy with which they are applied
to solve tasks (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990a). Thus, the analysis of individual patterns of
incorrect/correct scores on memory and transitivity test-pairs may shed more light on
individual differences (see also Cooney, 1995).
The purpose of this study was to introduce an individual-difference model for fuzzy
trace theory applied to transitive reasoning. This model was put to the test by means of
multilevel latent class models that were fitted to data collected in a large representative
sample of elementary-school students.
Individual-difference model of fuzzy trace theory applied to transitive reasoning
In our individual-difference model of fuzzy trace theory, children’s performance on
memory and transitivity test-pairs from a particular task is explained by the parallel
retrieval and usage of verbatim and gist traces (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995a). Individual dif-
ferences are explained from differences in the simultaneous use of verbatim and gist-trace
levels. We assumed a verbatim ability and a gist ability on which children may differ. Tai-
lored to transitive reasoning, verbatim ability refers to the capacity to remember the
premises, and gist ability refers to the capacity to use the appropriate pattern information
to infer the transitive relationship.
Probabilities to retrieve and use verbatim and gist-trace levels depend on verbatim or
gist ability levels. The higher the ability level, the higher the probability to retrieve and
accurately use the appropriate trace for a specific task and to produce a correct answer.
When children have a low ability level, they are expected to retrieve and use irrelevant
traces with high probability, and to retrieve and use relevant traces with low probability.
When children have high ability level, they retrieve and use irrelevant traces with low
probability, and relevant traces with high probability.
Verbatim and gist ability levels are expected to increase with age (Sternberg & Weil,
1980). Brainerd and Kingma (1984, 1985), Reyna and Brainerd (1990), and Reyna
(1992) posit that verbatim ability in transitive reasoning develops rather fast and reaches
completion at approximately five years of age. Gist ability develops at a slower pace and
is not expected to reach full development during childhood. Young school-aged children
in particular use verbatim memory while older children rely on gist traces (Reyna &
Brainerd, 1990; see also Dayton, 1998; Liben & Posnansky, 1977; Marx, 1985b, 1985a;
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pletely explain individual differences in verbatim and gist ability but intra-age variability
and differences in developmental rates may also have an effect (Wohlwill, 1973). Therefore,
studying individual differences and developmental trajectories instead of investigating the
abilities using fixed age-groups seems to be mandatory (see also Bouwmeester & Sijtsma,
in press).
Suppose a child has high verbatim ability level and low gist ability level and is required
to respond to a memory and a transitivity test-pair. Because of his/her high verbatim abil-
ity level we expect a high probability of retrieving a verbatim trace containing the correct
premise. Because of his/her low gist ability level we expect a low probability of retrieving
the correct pattern information. Thus, performance on the memory test-pairs is expected
to be good due to the high verbatim ability but performance on transitivity test-pairs is
expected to be poor due to the lack of pattern information. Suppose that another child
has both low verbatim and gist ability levels. We expect that (s)he has low probability
of retrieving a verbatim trace holding the correct premises and also low probability of
retrieving a gist trace containing relevant pattern information. Alternatively, (s)he has
high probability of using a verbatim trace that contains irrelevant verbatim information
(e.g., about the color of the objects when that is irrelevant) which does not lead to correct
answers. Suppose that a third child has high gist ability level. This child has high proba-
bility of using a gist trace containing relevant pattern information for inferring both the
memory and the transitivity test-pair, and this will most likely produce correct answers.
Note that here the verbatim ability level is not important: Once a child has a high gist abil-
ity level, (s)he is able to solve both the memory and the transitivity test-pairs by using the
accurate pattern information.
The summary of our individual-difference model so far is the following. We assume that
children differ in their verbatim and gist ability levels due to age differences and intra-age
variability. Depending on these ability levels, children are characterized by particular
probabilities to retrieve and use particular verbatim and gist-trace levels from a hierarchy
of trace levels. The combination of verbatim and gist-trace levels that are retrieved
determines performance on memory and transitivity test-pairs.
Retrieval of a particular trace is mediated by task cues, if they are available (Brainerd &
Reyna, 1990a). If the ordering of the objects is obvious (e.g., objects are shown simulta-
neously and ordered in ascending magnitude), a relatively low gist ability level may be suf-
ficient to retrieve an appropriate gist trace which contains all pattern information needed
for a correct answer. However, if lack of pattern cues makes it difficult to perceive the
ordering of the objects, a relatively low gist ability level may not be sufficient to retrieve
the appropriate gist trace. This may result in poor performance on the transitivity test-
pairs (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990a). Then it depends on the verbatim ability level whether
an accurate verbatim trace can be retrieved for solving the memory test-pairs.
Theoretically, confronted with a particular transitive reasoning task a child processes an
unlimited number of possible verbatim and gist-trace levels in parallel, each trace having its
own probability to be retrieved given ability level and available task cues. However, only
trace levels resulting in different response patterns can be distinguished in empirical data.
For example, when a child retrieves verbatim traces containing information about the color
of the objects (e.g., ‘‘I saw a red, a yellow, a green, an orange, and a purple stick’’) when in
fact length is the property of interest, probabilities of producing correct answers to the
memory test-pairs are approximately at chance level. Notice that similar probabilities result
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objects’ shape (e.g., ‘‘the sticks were vertical bars’’). The point is that these different verba-
tim traces each produce the same probability pattern (i.e., probabilities at chance level) and
that observed responses do not distinguish the traces that underlay them.
Three verbatim traces and three gist traces are expected to be empirically distinguish-
able. The first verbatim and gist-trace levels contain irrelevant information resulting in
success probabilities approximately at chance level, both for memory and transitivity
test-pairs. The third trace levels contain highly relevant information resulting in expected
success probabilities close to 1. To formulate the expected success probabilities for the
trace levels in between we used Trabasso’s work (Trabasso, 1977; Trabasso et al., 1975)
and Brainerd’s and Kingma’s (1984) work. The results of the experiments of Trabasso
and his colleagues (Bryant & Trabasso, 1971; Riley, 1976; Riley & Trabasso, 1974; Trab-
asso & Riley, 1975; Trabasso, 1977; Trabasso et al., 1975) and those of Brainerd and King-
ma (1984) both indicated that children produced a particular pattern of errors on the
memory and transitivity test-pairs when they did not completely remember the premise
information or when they did not completely perceive the pattern of the objects. These
particular patterns of errors are used to define the in-between verbatim- and gist-trace lev-
els in the next two subsections. To keep the discussion simple, we describe the verbatim
and gist-trace levels independently. That is, when describing verbatim traces we assume
gist ability level to be low, and when describing gist traces we assume verbatim ability level
to be low. However, notice that in the complete individual-difference model both abilities
function simultaneously and that the combination of verbatim and gist trace-levels
determines performance on memory and transitivity test-pairs.
Verbatim traces
Fig. 1 shows the relationships between verbatim ability, verbatim traces and
performance on memory test-pairs. Note that because the verbatim traces do not containFig. 1. Relationships between latent verbatim ability, latent verbatim trace, and performance on memory
test-pairs.
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pairs. The three levels in Fig. 1 are connected by two probability structures: One connects
ability levels with trace levels, and the other connects trace levels with memory test-pair
performance.
Verbatim ability is hypothesized to induce verbatim traces according to a particular
conditional probability structure. The probability distribution is defined as P(verbatim
trace Œ verbatim ability level), which is the probability of using a particular trace given
a particular verbatim ability level. Note that both verbatim ability and verbatim traces
are unobservable or, in our preferred terminology, latent.
We assume three trace levels. At the first level, the verbatim trace does not contain rel-
evant premises. Instead of such information, for example about the length of sticks, this
trace may contain information about the sticks’ color or shape. This lack of relevant infor-
mation has the effect that children guess for the correct answer to each of the memory test-
pairs (‘‘guessing’’ at the second level in Fig. 1) and, as a result, performance probabilities
are approximately at chance level.
At the second level, the verbatim trace contains relevant but incomplete premise infor-
mation. More specifically, based on the work of Trabasso and his collegues (Bryant &
Trabasso, 1971; Riley, 1976; Riley & Trabasso, 1974; Trabasso, 1977; Trabasso & Riley,
1975; Trabasso et al., 1975, see also Brainerd & Kingma, 1984) we expect primacy and
recency effects to lead to better performance on test pairs for the premises presented first
and last than on test pairs for the premises presented in between (‘‘temporal position’’ in
Fig. 1). In children’s short-term memory primacy effects tend to be stronger than recency
effects (Berch, 1979) and, consequently, this ordering is also expected to occur with the
memory test-pairs. Notice that Trabasso and his colleagues used the overlearning para-
digm and that their results may not be completely comparable with those for the standard
transitive reasoning task. However, although in their experiments performance on the
memory test-pairs was almost perfect by the end of the training session, the particular
kinds of errors made during training were the same as those made in the standard transi-
tive reasoning task (see e.g., Brainerd & Kingma, 1984).
At the third level, the verbatim trace contains all the relevant premises. This results in
high performance probabilities on all memory test-pairs (‘‘complete memory’’ in Fig. 1).
The conditional probability structure is the following. It is hypothesized that P(guessing
trace Œability level) decreases as a function of ability (i.e., with increasing ability it is less
likely that the guessing trace is retrieved), and is maximal when ability level is low; P(tem-
poral-position trace Œability level) first increases and then decreases as a function of ability
and is maximal when the ability level is intermediate (i.e., the temporal-position trace is
characteristic of intermediate ability levels, but rare for low and high levels); and P(com-
plete-memory trace Œability level) increases as a function of ability and is maximal when
ability level is high (i.e., the complete-memory trace is most easily retrieved at high ability
levels). These hypothesis are visualized in Fig. 1: Solid black arrows between the two latent
variable levels indicate high probability, grey dotted arrows indicate lower probability,
and light grey dotted arrows indicate low probability.
Gist traces
Fig. 2 shows the relationships between gist ability, gist traces and performance on
memory and transitivity test-pairs. The unitary-trace model (Brainerd & Kingma, 1984)
Fig. 2. Relationships between latent gist ability, latent gist trace, and performance on memory and transitivity
test-pairs.
S. Bouwmeester et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 41–74 49predicts that a gist trace affects performance on both memory and transitivity test-pairs.
One probability structure connects the ability and trace levels, and another connects the
trace and performance levels.
As with verbatim abilities and traces, it is hypothesized that gist ability induces gist
traces according to a particular conditional probability structure. Three gist traces were
hypothesized. Each gist trace corresponds with a particular probability of answering a
memory or a transitivity test-pair correctly.
At the first level, relevant pattern information is absent and children guess for the
correct answer on all memory and transitivity test-pairs (‘‘guessing’’ in Fig. 2). This is
likely to result in poor performance.
At the second level, the gist trace contains relevant pattern information but not the
complete ordering. Bryant and Trabasso (1971) and Trabasso et al. (1975; see also Brain-
erd and Kingma, 1984) showed that when forming an internal representation, the end-an-
chored pairs are learned first followed by the middle pairs. Thus, it is expected that
performance on the test pairs in the middle will be poorer than on the end-anchor test
pairs. This is a spatial-position effect. Because it uses only part of the ordering informa-
tion, we expect that this effect will occur at the second trace level (‘‘spatial position’’ in
Fig. 2). The performance probabilities are expected to be high for memory and transitivity
test-pairs on both ends of the ordering, and lower for test pairs in between. For example,
when five objects are ordered as YA < YB < YC < YD < YE and a child uses the spatial-
position trace, good performance is expected on memory test-pairs [A,B] and [D,E] and
transitivity test pairs [A,C] and [C,E]; and poorer performance is expected on the other
test pairs. The spatial-position effect may also occur at only one end of the ordering;
for example, when the gist trace is ‘‘right-side objects are large’’.
At the third level, the trace contains the complete pattern information for reproducing
the memory test-pairs and inferring the transitive relationships. The success probabilities
on all memory and transitivity test-pairs are expected to be high. The conditional proba-
bility structure is the following. It is hypothesized that P(guessing trace Œ ability level)
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tion trace Œ ability level) first increases as a function of ability, reaches its maximum when
ability level is intermediate, and then decreases; and P(complete-ordering trace Œ ability
level) increases as a function of ability, and is maximal when ability level is high. These
hypothesis are visualized in Fig. 2: Solid black arrows between the two latent variable lev-
els indicate high probability, grey dotted arrows indicate lower probability, and light grey
dotted arrows indicate low probability.
Transitive-reasoning tasks and task manipulations
Children may differ in their verbatim and gist ability levels and this will likely result in
different performance on transitive reasoning tasks. Transitive reasoning tasks may also
vary in difficulty level depending on the complexity of the operations that have to be per-
formed to infer the transitive relationship (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990a). The fewer cues the
task offers for perception of pattern information, the more difficult the task. Chapman and
Lindenberger (1992) argued that fuzzy trace theory is not valid when tasks offer only few
cues or no cues whatsoever for perceiving the ordering of the objects (e.g., in tasks in
which the premise pairs are presented successively). Brainerd and Reyna (1992) posit that
gist traces can be used to solve tasks in which objects are presented simultaneously and
tasks in which objects are presented successively, but that pattern information is easier
to perceive in simultaneously presented tasks. Tasks in which the objects are successively
presented are more difficult.
Retrieval of a trace containing the appropriate pattern information is easier when the
position of the objects is ordered rather than disordered (Verweij, 1994). Also, when pre-
sentation of the objects is ordered, trace retrieval is expected to be easier than when pre-
sentation is disordered. Reyna and Brainerd (1990) and Brainerd and Reyna (1992) noted
that scrambling the premises greatly increases the difficulty of transitivity tasks (see also
Chapman & Lindenberger, 1988; Riley, 1976). Note that these task variations are not
expected to influence performance on memory test-pairs, because such test pairs can be
solved by means of verbatim traces which are not expected to be influenced by variations
in pattern cues.
Verbatim and gist traces are processed in parallel. Thus, the combination of each of the
three verbatim-trace levels and each of the three gist-trace levels yields nine possible com-
binations, each of which induces typical performance on memory and transitivity test-
pairs. Task characteristics are expected to differentially influence the retrieval of verbatim
and gist traces. For example, when objects in a task are positioned in a linear order and
also presented in a linear order the cues on ordering are obvious. As a consequence, the
required gist ability level is lower than when, for example, the objects are not positioned
or presented in a linear order.
Based on such considerations, we used three kinds of tasks that may be characterized as
(1) ordered position, ordered presentation (OposOpres); (2) ordered position, disordered
presentation (OposDpres); and (3) disordered position, ordered presentation (DposOpres).
The combination of ‘‘disordered position, disordered presentation’’ was not used because
it was expected to be too difficult even for adults Brainerd and Reyna, 1992; Verweij, 1994.
With each task type, first four premise pairs were presented before children were confront-
ed with four memory test-pairs and three transitivity test-pairs. The description of the task
types is as follows.
Fig. 3. Example of the premise presentation of an ‘‘Ordered Position, Ordered Presentation’’ task; letters A, B, C,
D, and E were not visible to the children.
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Objects in OposOpres tasks are ordered from small to large or from large to small. The
presentation of the premises is also ordered. Thus, first premise pair [A,B] is presented,
followed consecutively by premise pairs [B,C], [C,D], and [D,E]. Ordered presentation
of ordered objects renders the use of pattern information from gist traces rather easy.
Fig. 3 shows the four premises of an OposOpres task. Note that the greys in fact were yel-
low, green, purple, red, orange, and blue when presented to the children. Box 1 presents
the first premise pair, box 2 the second premise pair, and so on. The ‘‘test pair’’ box shows
the first memory test-pair [A,B], denoted as M1.
For combinations of verbatim and gist-trace levels, Table 1 shows the expected perfor-
mance patterns on the memory and transitivity test-pairs of the OposOpres tasks. When
gist-trace level is intermediate or high, expected performance is good because pattern infor-
mation can easily be used to infer the relationships in both the memory and transitivity
test-pairs. When gist-trace level is low, the combination with
• low verbatim-trace level is expected to result in guessing, yielding success probabilities
at approximately chance level on all memory and transitivity test-pairs;
• intermediate verbatim-trace level is expected to produce temporal-position effects,
resulting in moderate performance on the first and last memory test-pairs (M1:[A, B]
and M4:[D,E]) and poor performance on all other memory and transitivity test pairs;
andTable 1
Expected performance on the test pairs of OposOpres tasks for nine combinations of trace levels
Verbatim Gist Memory Transitivity
M1 M2 M3 M4 T1 T2 T3
Low Low       
Intermediate • • • • • • •
High • • • • • • •
Intermediate Low       
Intermediate • • • • • • •
High • • • • • • •
High Low • • • •   
Intermediate • • • • • • •
High • • • • • • •
, poor performance; , moderate performance; •, good performance.
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yielding high success probabilities on the memory test-pairs and low success probabil-
ities on the transitivity test-pairs.
Ordered position, disordered presentation tasks (OposDpres tasks)
In OposDpres tasks, the objects are ordered from small to large or large to small. The pre-
sentation of the premise pairs is disordered; for example, in Fig. 4 first [C,D] is presented,
followed consecutively by [A,B], [D,E], and [B,C]. The midterm relationships are always
presented first and last, and the end anchors are always presented in between. Therefore,
we are able to distinguish a temporal-position effect from a spatial-position effect in perfor-
mance on the memory test-pairs (see also Brainerd & Kingma, 1984). Let  denote poor per-
formance and  moderate performance; then for the temporal-position effect, on the four
memory test-pairs we expect the pattern () and for the spatial-position effect we
expect (). Disordered presentation renders the use of gist traces more difficult than
ordered presentation because it is more difficult to recognize the ordering of the objects.
The ‘‘test pair’’ box in Fig. 4 shows the first transitivity test-pair [A,C], denoted as T1.
For all nine combinations of verbatim and gist-trace levels, Table 2 shows the expected
performance on the memory and transitivity test-pairs of the OposDpres tasks. When
verbatim-trace level is low, the combination withFig. 4. Example of the premise presentation of an ‘‘Ordered Position, Disordered Presentation’’ task; letters A, B,
C, D, and E were not visible to the children.
Table 2
Expected performance on the test pairs of OposDpres tasks for nine combinations of trace levels
Verbatim Gist Hypothesized probabilities
Memory Transitivity
M1 M2 M3 M4 T1 T2 T3
Low Low       
Intermediate       
High • • • • • • •
Intermediate Low       
Intermediate       
High • • • • • • •
High Low • • • •   
Intermediate • • • •   
High • • • • • • •
, poor performance; , moderate performance; •, good performance.
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pairs;
• intermediate gist-trace level produces a spatial-position effect which results in moderate
performance on the end anchors, M2:[A, B], M3:[D, E], T2:[A, C], and T3:[C, E]; and
poor performance on the other test pairs; and
• high gist-trace level produces good performance on all test pairs because the ordering
information can be used to solve both memory and transitivity test-pairs.
When verbatim-trace level is intermediate, temporal position effects are expected for the
memory test-pairs. The combination of intermediate verbatim-trace level with
• low gist-trace level produces only temporal-position effects, yielding moderate perfor-
mance on the first and last presented memory test-pairs (M1:[B,C] and M4:[C, D])
and poor performance on all other memory and transitivity test-pairs;
• intermediate gist-trace level produces both temporal position and spatial-position effects
resulting in moderate performance on all memory and transitivity test-pairs except
T1:[B, D]. That is, for the temporal-position effect we expect the pattern ( )
(notice that a temporal-position effect does not influence the performance on transitiv-
ity test-pairs), and for the spatial-position effect we expect the pattern ( ).
When both effects influence performance simultaneously, we expect the pattern:
( ); and
• high gist-trace level produces good performance on all memory and transitivity test-
pairs.
When verbatim-trace level is high, the combination with
• low gist-trace level produces complete memory of the premises, resulting in high success
probabilities. Because pattern information is not available, poor performance is expect-
ed on the transitivity test-pairs;
• intermediate gist-trace level produces complete memory and a spatial-position effect
resulting in good performance on all memory test-pairs and moderate performance
on the end-anchored transitivity test-pairs T2:[A, C] and T3:[C, E]; and
• high gist-trace level leads to good performance on all test pairs.
Disordered position, ordered presentation tasks (DposOpres tasks)
In DposOpres tasks, the objects are positioned disorderly. For example, in Fig. 5 stick A is
in the third position in the box and stick B is in the first position. The presentation of the
premises is ordered. In Fig. 5, first premise pair [A,B] is presented, followed consecutively
by premise pairs [B,C], [C,D], and [D,E]. Because positional cues about the ordering of
the objects are not provided, a disordered position is expected to require both high verbatim
and gist-ability levels. Consequently, not only the ordering has to be recognized but also the
premises have to be memorized. The ‘‘test pair’’ box (Fig. 5) shows the first memory test-pair.
Table 3 shows the expected performance patterns on the memory and transitivity
test-pairs of DposOpres tasks for all combinations of verbatim and gist-trace levels. When
verbatim-trace level is low (i.e., when the guessing trace operates), performance is expected
to be poor on all memory and transitivity test-pairs independent of gist-trace level. At least
Fig. 5. Example of the premise presentation of a ‘‘Disordered Position, Ordered Presentation’’ task; letters A, B,
C, D, and E were not visible to the children.
Table 3
Expected performance on the test pairs of DposOpres tasks for nine combinations of trace levels
Verbatim Gist Hypothesized probabilities
Memory Transitivity
M1 M2 M3 M4 T1 T2 T3
Low Low       
Intermediate       
High       
Intermediate Low       
Intermediate       
High       
High Low • • • •   
Intermediate • • • •   
High • • • • • • •
, poor performance; , moderate performance; •, good performance.
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ordering of the objects. When verbatim-trace level is intermediate, the combination with
• low and intermediate gist-trace levels produces temporal-position effects resulting in
moderate performance on the first and last presented memory test-pairs (M1:[A, B]
and M4:[D, E]); and
• high gist-trace level produces spatial-position effects yielding moderate performance on
the end-anchors (M1:[A, B], M4:[D,E], T1:[A, C], and T3:[C,E]).
When verbatim-trace level is high, the combination with
• low and intermediate gist-trace levels produces complete memory resulting in good perfor-
mance on the memory test-pairs but poor performance on transitivity test-pairs; and
• high gist-trace level produces good performance on all memory and transitivity
test-pairs.
Theoretical model and research questions
Fig. 6 shows the individual-difference model of fuzzy trace theory with respect to tran-
sitive reasoning. At the highest level (technically referred to as the third level of analysis)




































56 S. Bouwmeester et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 41–74are the verbatim and gist-ability levels. These abilities govern the verbatim and gist traces
through conditional probability processes. The traces constitute the second level of
analysis. The abilities and the traces are latent (i.e., unobservable). The traces govern
the probabilities of manifest (i.e., observable) correct and incorrect responses to the
memory and transitivity test-pairs of the three kinds of tasks. This is the first level of
analysis.
Abilities are usually assumed to be continuous (Embretson & Reise, 2000). For transi-
tive reasoning we have no reason to deviate from this general assumption; thus, statistical-
ly the verbatim and gist abilities are considered continuous latent variables. Further, we
have distinguished three ordered verbatim traces and three ordered gist traces. Statistical-
ly, these triplets of latent traces can be conceived of as ordered categorical latent variables.
The individual-difference model for transitive reasoning (Fig. 6) fits our data when the
estimated probabilities of performance on test pairs are similar in relative magnitude to the
hypothesized probabilities (see Tables 1–3). A fitting model explains individual differences
in performance on memory and transitivity test-pairs due to the differential use of
verbatim and gist-trace levels.
Brainerd and Kingma (1984) provided a sophisticated description of fuzzy trace
theory and its observable consequences for different task manipulations, but the statis-
tical methods available at the time did not allow modeling of response patterns and indi-
vidual differences. They tested fuzzy trace theory on a priori identified fixed age groups,
and used mean scores per age group to test hypotheses about verbatim and gist traces.
Thus, they were able to test the contours of fuzzy trace theory but their methodology
did not enable them to distinguish individual differences or groups of individuals using
the same combination of verbatim and gist traces. In this study, we used modern latent
class analysis (Vermunt, 2003) to distinguish groups of children that differ in their use of
verbatim and gist traces when responding to memory and transitivity test-pairs. The
data for the latent class analysis were the patterns of incorrect/correct scores (score 0
for an incorrect answer and score 1 for a correct answer) on the four memory test-pairs
and the three transitivity test-pairs in each task; there were 12 tasks in total, to be
discussed shortly.
First, the fit of the complete fuzzy trace model (as formulated in Fig. 6) to these data
was investigated. The fit of the model was compared to that of several competing models
which reflected alternative data structures derived from Piaget’s theory (Piaget, 1942,
1947) and linear ordering theory (Trabasso et al., 1975). Second, at a more detailed level
the performance on each of the test pairs as predicted by the fuzzy trace model was com-
pared to the performance reflected by the empirical data. Third, the relationship between
age and verbatim and gist ability was investigated.
From theoretical model to statistical model
Multilevel latent class modeling (Vermunt, 2003) was used to evaluate the fit of the
theoretical model (Fig. 6) to the data. This method was preferred over the traditional
and much-used analysis of variance (ANOVA) model for three reasons. First, the
manifest dependent variables are binary incorrect/correct scores, whereas ANOVA
assumes dependent variables to be continuous and normally distributed. This assump-
tion is unrealistic in our application. Second, at two levels in the theoretical model
the data are dependent or nested within the levels of higher-order variables: (1) the
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ity test-pair scores—are mutually dependent to some degree due to the combinations
of trace levels that are retrieved. For example, when a child retrieves the gist trace
‘‘objects become smaller from right to left’’, (s)he is able to infer all memory and
transitivity test-pairs correctly; and (2) the combination of verbatim and gist traces
(intermediate level) that is used for solving a particular task is dependent on the
child’s verbatim and gist ability levels (highest level). A multilevel model incorporates
these dependencies, whereas a within-subject ANOVA is unable to do this. Ignoring
this dependence reduces the power of statistical tests. Third, the theoretical model
encompasses both manifest and latent variables, whereas an ANOVA model can deal
only with manifest variables. To summarize, multilevel latent class models are more
appropriate for evaluating the fit of the theoretical model to the data than ANOVA
models.
The basis of the multilevel latent class model is the simple latent class model (Clogg,
1988; Heinen, 1996; McCutcheon, 1987; see also Jansen & Van der Maas, 1997; Raijmak-
ers, Jansen, & Van der Maas, 2004; Rindskopf, 1987). A latent class model may be inter-
preted as a factor analysis model for categorical data, such as the 0/1 scores on the test
pairs, which usually results in a limited number of homogeneous subgroups of respon-
dents. Because these subgroups are identified from the patterns of incorrect/correct scores
rather than from an a priori defined sub-grouping based on age or educational level, they
are called latent classes.
Latent class analysis of 0/1 scores from the memory and transitivity test-pairs yields
two kinds of estimated probabilities. First, there are so-called class probabilities which
add up to 1 and reflect the relative size of each of the latent classes. Suppose a latent class
model with three classes is found to fit the data best, and these classes have class proba-
bilities equal to .35, .40 and .25. Applied to our study, these probabilities would mean, for
example, that on a particular task 35% of the children retrieve a low verbatim-trace level
(i.e., ‘‘guessing trace’’), 40% retrieve an intermediate verbatim-trace level (i.e., ‘‘temporal-
position trace’’), and 25% retrieve a high verbatim-trace level (i.e., ‘‘complete-memory
trace’’).
Second, consider the three transitivity test-pairs for each task in this study. For each
transitivity test-pair, each latent class is characterized by a conditional probability of a
correct answer given membership in that class. For example, within a particular latent
class the conditional probabilities of producing correct responses to the transitivity test-
pairs [A,C], [B,D], and [C,E] of the OpresOpos tasks are found to be .9, .5, and .9, respec-
tively. The members of this latent class—here assumed to correspond to a particular trace
level—will respond correctly with high probability to the first and last transitivity test-
pairs while their responses to the middle transitivity test-pairs can go either way. These
conditional response probabilities can be used to understand performance typical in this
latent class. For example, the (artificial) conditional probabilities given here may suggest
a spatial-position trace. Conditional probabilities are unlikely to reach the value of 1
because some children may become bored, tired, or lose concentration, even if they have
high ability levels.
Conditional response probabilities help to interpret the latent classes. Their role is com-
parable to the role patterns of factor loadings play in establishing the meaning of factors in
a factor analysis. The class probabilities and the conditional response probabilities togeth-
er can be used to determine for each respondent in which latent class (s)he belongs most
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pairs.
Our statistical model is an extension of the simple latent class model (see also Raijmak-
ers et al., 2004) in two respects. First, the latent class model for the responses to a partic-
ular task is connected to the latent abilities by means of a multilevel structure; hence, a
multilevel latent class model is used. Second, the probability of retrieving a particular dis-
crete trace level is modeled as a function of the continuous ability level. This is done by
means of the partial credit model (Masters, 1982); this is an item response model that is
particularly suited for explaining an ordered, discrete dependent variable (here, a trace)
from an independent continuous variable (here, an ability). Appendix A provides a tech-
nical description of the multilevel latent class model, including the two extensions (i.e., the
multilevel model and the partial credit model).
The program Latent Gold (Vermunt & Magidson, 2005) was used to estimate the class
probabilities and the conditional response probabilities of the model, and compute the fit
statistics. For evaluating the fit of the model to the data, the sample was randomly split
into two halves. The first half was used to evaluate the improvement of the fit of different,
competing models. Next, the fit of the hypothesized model estimated in the first half of the
sample was compared with the fit of the same model in the second half. When the fit sta-
tistics in both halves were close, the degree of chance capitalization was small and the
model could be considered valid for the population.
General data analysis procedure
The data analysis is divided and discussed in three sections. First, the fuzzy trace model
was estimated from the data and the fit of the model to the data was compared with that of
alternative models for transitive reasoning. Second, the estimated probability structure
was compared with the probability structure expected from the theory (see Tables 1–3).
Third, the relationship between age and estimated ability level was investigated. Before
that, descriptions are given of the instrument, the sample, the procedure, and the design
of the study, and some preliminary analyses are discussed.
Method
Instrument
An individual computer test for transitive reasoning was constructed (Bouwmeester &
Aalbers, 2004). Binary performance scores were registered automatically during test
administration. Four test versions each presented the tasks in a different order. Each child
was administered one randomly chosen version. The use of four versions was meant to rule
out order effects due to task presentation. This was checked statistically by means of an
ANOVA.
Sample
The transitive reasoning test was administered to 409 children ranging from 5 to 13
years of age. Children came from four elementary schools in the Netherlands. They
were from middle class social-economic status families. Table 4 shows the number of
Table 4
Number of children, mean age in months (M) and standard deviation (SD) in each grade
Grade Number Age
M SD
Kindergarten 39 73.67 4.70
1 65 86.15 4.81
2 70 100.16 5.85
3 60 111.80 5.80
4 63 123.44 5.52
5 58 140.31 7.69
6 54 146.18 6.61
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grade.
Design
Three types of tasks were used: OposOpres, OposDpres, and DposOpres. Four versions of
each task type were administered; thus, there were 12 tasks in total. The four tasks of
the same type differed with respect to the colors of the sticks, and with respect to the direc-
tion of the ordering or the presentation; that is, sticks could be ordered from left to right
or from right to left, and they could be presented from small to large, or from large to
small. One task type was always followed by a different type. We did not use a fully
randomized design because the tasks differed clearly in difficulty level. For example, the
OposOpres tasks were much easier than the DposOpres tasks, and in a fully randomized
design it would have been possible that children would be consecutively administered three
difficult DposOpres tasks. We expected that this would discourage especially the younger
children. Based on previous research (Bouwmeester & Sijtsma, in press), we expected that
the bias in the results caused by lack of motivation would be much greater than possible
bias caused by non-randomization.
The presentation of the premises was followed by the presentation of the four memory
test-pairs and the three transitivity test-pairs, respectively. The ordering of the memory
test-pairs was always the same as the ordering in which the premises had been presented.
A 1-score was assigned when the child touched the correct stick on the pc-screen; and a
0-score was assigned otherwise. For each child, 7 (test pairs) · 3 (task types) · 4 (task-type
versions) = 84 scores were collected.Procedure
The test was administered in a quiet room in the school building. The experimenter
started a short conversation with the child to put her/him at ease. Two introductory tasks
were presented in which it was explained that each time the child had to touch the longest
stick. Next, the experimenter explained that there were 13 additional tasks and that the
child had to try these tasks on her/his own. The child did not know that the first of the
13 tasks was another introductory task that was meant to let her/him get used to the idea
that (s)he had to work on her/his own now.
Table 5
Means (M, aggregated over test pairs of the same task), standard errors (SE) and 95% confidence intervals (CI)
for the task versions (Denoted as A, B, C and D) of each of the three task types
Version OposOpres OposDpres DposOpres
M SE 95% CIa M SE 95% CIa M SE 95% CIa
A .75 .02 .71–.78 .72 .01 .68–.75 .57 .01 .54–.60
B .78 .01 .74–.81 .69 .01 .66–.72 .59 .01 .56–.62
C .79 .01 .76–.82 .65 .01 .62–.69 .55 .01 .52–.58
D .78 .01 .75–.82 .75 .01 .72–.79 .57 .01 .54–.60
a Bonferroni adjustment.
60 S. Bouwmeester et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 41–74Preliminary analysis
An ANOVA was performed to check for possible order effects of the tasks on the num-
ber-correct score for the 84 items in total. Number-correct score served as dependent var-
iable and test-version as independent variable. It was found that the four test versions did
not differ significantly [F(3, 401) = 1.32, p > .05]. Thus, presentation order of tasks had no
effect on number-correct score.
A within-subject ANOVA was done to test whether the four task versions of the three
task types differed with respect to number-correct score. Table 5 shows the means
(aggregated over test pairs) and the 95% confidence intervals. For OposOpres tasks, task
versions differed significantly [F(2.75,1112.58) = 2.93, p = .037] but partial g2 (for effect
size; Cohen, 1977) was small (.007) and confidence intervals overlapped. For OposDpres
tasks, task versions differed significantly [F(2.64, 1069.67) = 15.60, p = .000] but partial
g2 was small (.037) and confidence intervals overlapped. For DposOpres tasks, task versions
differed significantly [F(2.98,1202.23) = 3.46, p = .016] but partial g2 was small (.007) and
confidence intervals overlapped. Although a few task versions differed significantly with
respect to average performance, effect sizes were small and confidence intervals showed
that in all cases differences between task versions were small.1 It was concluded that all
task versions could be used to estimate the model.Results
Analysis section 1: Fitting structural models
Alternative models for fuzzy trace theory
The individual-difference model of fuzzy trace theory is represented as Model A in
Fig. 7. Other models were the following. Fuzzy trace theory assumes continuous verbatim
and gist abilities, and discrete verbatim and gist traces each with three ordered levels.
Model B is much simpler in that it lacks a latent variable structure. This model resembles
an ANOVA on average scores for the three task types, and agrees with how Brainerd and
Kingma (1984, 1985) tested their hypotheses; that is, the analysis of average scores allows1 Note that a significant overall F-value does not guarantee that individual groups differ significantly (Stevens,
1996, pp. 163–164 ).
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means of their responses to different test pairs.
Linear ordering theory predicts that one ability suffices to form a complete linear order-
ing. Experience with latent class analysis has shown that fitting more than five ordered
classes does not improve the fit of the model anymore (Van Onna, 2002). Thus, linear
ordering theory with five latent classes is represented by Model C.
Piaget’s theory predicts that because each task involves the use of the same rules of log-
ic, task manipulations do not influence performance on test pairs. This is represented by
Model D, which assumes a direct effect of ability level on performance without intervening
trace levels.
Our individual-difference model (i.e., Model A) assumes that three verbatim-trace levels
and three gist-trace levels are optimal. This model is tested against models having either
two trace levels (Model E) or four trace levels (Model F).
Specific results
Table 6 shows the fit results for models A through F. Model B, that consist only of
manifest variables for task type and item type, fitted poorer than model C that had one
ability governing five ordered trace levels [Table 6; see fit statistics BIC, AIC3, and the
decrease in log-likelihood (denoted LL)]. The decrease in LL given the increase in num-
ber of parameters of Model A relative to Model C was substantial; thus, Model A fitted
better than Model C. Model D, that formalizes a direct effect of ability level on perfor-
mance, fitted poorer than model A (see BIC, AIC3, and decrease in LL). Thus, the trace
levels cannot be omitted as model D suggests. Model A (three trace levels) fitted better
than model E (two trace levels) but model F (four trace levels) fitted better than model
A. However, two of the four classes in Model F had nearly the same interpretation;
thus, three trace levels seemed to be optimal to distinguish relevant groups. We conclude
that Model A describes the data best.
Chance capitalization was evaluated by fitting Model A to the second random half of
the sample (Table 6). Because due to missing values the numbers of records (sub-
jects · items per subject) were not exactly the same in both subsamples (2426 and 2434
records), we compared the mean LL per record. For the first sample, the mean LL equal-
led 3.66, and for the second sample it equalled 3.73. Thus, Model A fitted almost
equally well in both samples.Table 6
Fit measures for the estimated models
Model Description LL #Par BIC AIC3
A 2 abilities, 2 traces containing 3 levels 8880.33 69 18298.45 17967.67
B Full independence between observed responses 35633.15 8 71341.27 71290.30
C 1 ability, 1 trace containing 5 levels 9014.70 47 18395.71 18164.49
D 2 abilities, without mediation by traces 9259.08 63 19009.18 18707.18
E 2 abilities, 2 traces containing 2 levels 8914.07 67 18350.34 18029.14
F 2 abilities, 2 traces containing 4 levels 8848.05 71 18249.47 17909.10
Cross Model A 9090.06 69
LL, log Likelihood (goodness of fit statistic); #Par, number of parameters in the model.
BIC, 2LL + #par · ln (N) (for N = 204); AIC3: 2LL + 3 · #par.
Both BIC and AIC3 are information criteria for comparing alternative models.
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The result of the first analysis section showed that the fit of model A—the individual-
difference fuzzy trace theory model—was better than the fit of alternative models B, C, D,
and E. It may be noted that Piaget’s theory and linear ordering theory are not as explicit
with respect to transitive reasoning as fuzzy trace theory; thus, the formalized models for
these alternative theories are more liable to subjective interpretation than the fuzzy trace
theory model. Nevertheless, the aspects of these alternative theories of which we were cer-
tain were represented in the formal models and if they had been valid, they should have
been reflected in the estimated data structure.
Analysis section 2: Reproduction of probability structure
For all test pairs, the estimated performance probabilities on the memory and transitiv-
ity test-pairs of model A were compared with the expected performance probabilities
(Tables 1–3).
Specific results
Global comparison of expected and estimated probabilities. Table 7 shows the structure of the
estimated performance probabilities for the seven test pairs in each task, for each combina-
tion of verbatim and gist-trace levels. Standard errors of the estimated probabilities (not tab-
ulated here) were between 0.000 and 0.077 (mean = 0.03, standard deviation = 0.02); thus,
estimation was accurate.
For a convenient presentation of multiple results, estimated probabilities were
summarized in three categories: Notation  means probability is lower than .65;  means
probability is between .65 and .80; and • means probability is higher than .80.
For the memory test-pairs (M1, M2, M3, and M4) a low gist-trace level in combination
with (1) a low verbatim-trace level produced low probabilities (rows 1, 2, 3); (2) an inter-
mediate verbatim-trace level produced higher probabilities (rows 10, 11, 12); and (3) a high
verbatim-ability level produced high probabilities (rows 19, 20, 21). This pattern was not
found for the transitivity test-pairs (T1, T2, and T3). Because ability influenced perfor-
mance on memory test-pairs but not on transitivity test-pairs, the first latent ability in
Model A could be interpreted as verbatim ability.
For low gist-trace level (Table 7, second column), probabilities for transitivity test-
pairs (T1, T2, and T3) are low (rows 1, 2, 3; 10, 11, 12; and 19, 20, 21); for interme-
diate gist-trace level in general probabilities are higher (rows 4, 5, 6; 13, 14, 15; and
22, 23, 24); and for high gist-trace level in general probabilities are highest (rows 7, 8,
9; 16, 17, 18; and 25, 26, 27). Because ability influenced both performance on memory
and transitivity test-pairs, the second ability in Model A could be interpreted as gist
ability.
Fig. 8a shows the distribution of verbatim-trace levels given verbatim ability. As expect-
ed, the probability of using a low verbatim-trace level is maximal when verbatim-ability
level is low and decreases as ability increases; the probability of using an intermediate ver-
batim-trace level first increases and then decreases as a function of ability and is maximal
when verbatim-ability level is intermediate; and the probability of using a high verbatim-
trace level increases as a function of ability and is maximal when ability level is high.
Fig. 8b shows the distribution of gist-trace levels given gist ability. The interpretation is
the same as that for the verbatim-trace levels.
Table 7
Global estimated success probability for the test pairs of three task-types, for nine combinations of latent trace
levels
Verbatim trace Gist trace Task type Estimated probabilities
Memory Transitivity
M1 M2 M3 M4 T1 T2 T3
Low Low OposOpres       
OposDpres       
DposOpres       
Intermediate OposOpres • • • • • • •
OposDpres   • •   •
DposOpres       
High OposOpres • • • • • • •
OposDpres • • • • • • •
DposOpres       
Intermediate Low OposOpres • • • •   
OposDpres • • •    
DposOpres •      
Intermediate OposOpres • • • • • • •
OposDpres • • • •  • •
DposOpres • •     
High OposOpres • • • • • • •
OposDpres • • • • • • •
DposOpres • •  • •  
High Low OposOpres • • • •   
OposDpres • • • •   
DposOpres • • • •   
Intermediate OposOpres • • • • • • •
OposDpres • • • •  • •
DposOpres • • • • •  
High OposOpres • • • • • • •
OposDpres • • • • • • •
DposOpres • • • • •  •
, <.65; , .65–.79; •, >.79.
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the hypothesized and the estimated performance probabilities of the test pairs of the four
OposOpres tasks. The majority of the estimated probability patterns agreed with the
hypothesized patterns. However, in the fourth row the patterns of the hypothesized and
the estimated probabilities differed for the memory test-pairs: It was hypothesized that
intermediate verbatim-trace level and low gist-trace level produce a temporal-position
effect, thus predicting moderate probabilities for the memory test-pairs presented first
and last (i.e., M1 and M4) and low probabilities for the test pairs in between (i.e., M2
and M3). However, the high probabilities found suggest complete memory of the premises.
Table 8
Estimated success probability for the test pairs of tasks OposOpres for nine combinations of latent trace levels
Verbatim Gist Hypothesized probabilities Estimated probabilities
Memory Transitivity Memory Transitivity
M1 M2 M3 M4 T1 T2 T3 M1 M2 M3 M4 T1 T2 T3
Low Low        .59 .48 .38 .49 .55 .56 .50
Intermediate • • • • • • • .94 .97 .95 .96 .97 .94 .97
High • • • • • • • .99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .99 1.00
Intermediate Low        .93 .95 1.00 .99 .49 .46 .48
Intermediate • • • • • • • .99 1.00 1.00 1.00 .97 .91 .96
High • • • • • • • 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .99 1.00
High Low • • • •    .99 1.00 1.00 1.00 .43 .36 .46
Intermediate • • • • • • • 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .96 .87 .96
High • • • • • • • 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .99 1.00
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Fig. 8. Distribution of verbatim-trace levels given verbatim ability (a) and distribution of gist-trace levels given
gist ability (b).
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patterns agreed with the hypothesized patterns but that patterns differed in rows 2 and 4. It
was hypothesized that low verbatim-trace level and intermediate gist-trace level together
(row 2) produce a spatial-position effect which results in higher probabilities for the
end-anchored test-pairs than for the mid-term test-pairs (Table 9, row 2; the end-anchored
test-pairs were M2, M3, T2 and T3). However, the estimated probabilities showed that this
spatial-position effect was only active on one end-anchor, which led to high probabilities
for the test pairs M3 and T3. Also, it was hypothesized that intermediate verbatim-trace
level and low gist-trace level together (row 4) produce a temporal-position effect, but
the estimated probabilities showed such an effect only for the first memory test-pairs
(M1 and M2).
For the four DposOpres tasks, Table 10 shows that four estimated probability patterns
agreed with the hypothesized patterns (in rows 1, 2, 7, and 9). Five patterns (in rows 3,
4, 5, 6, 8) were different. First, for low verbatim-trace level and high gist-trace level (Table
10, row 3), for all test pairs low probabilities were hypothesized. However, the estimated
Table 10
Estimated success probability for the test pairs of tasks DposOpres for nine combinations of latent trace levels
Verbatim Gist Hypothesized probabilities Estimated probabilities
Memory Transitivity Memory Transitivity
M1 M2 M3 M4 T1 T2 T3 M1 M2 M3 M4 T1 T2 T3
Low Low        .50 .24 .25 .19 .50 .57 .47
Intermediate        .61 .38 .32 .39 .66 .56 .62
High        .71 .54 .41 .64 .79 .56 .75
Intermediate Low        .88 .71 .63 .52 .61 .63 .53
Intermediate        .92 .83 .71 .75 .75 .63 .67
High        .94 .90 .78 .89 .85 .63 .78
High Low • • • •    .98 .95 .90 .84 .71 .69 .58
Intermediate • • • •    .99 .97 .93 .93 .82 .69 .71
High • • • • • • • .99 .99 .95 .98 .90 .69 .82
, <.65; , .65–.79; •, >.79.
Table 9
Estimated success probability for the test pairs of tasks OposDpres for nine combinations of latent trace levels
Verbatim Gist Hypothesized probabilities Estimated probabilities
Memory Transitivity Memory Transitivity
M1 M2 M3 M4 T1 T2 T3 M1 M2 M3 M4 T1 T2 T3
Low Low        .45 .41 .50 .46 .47 .44 .46
Intermediate        .71 .74 .87 .82 .79 .79 .89
High • • • • • • • .88 .92 .98 .96 .94 .95 .99
Intermediate Low        .95 .85 .80 .73 .45 .54 .55
Intermediate        .98 .96 .97 .94 .78 .85 .92
High • • • • • • • .99 .99 1.00 .99 .94 .96 .99
High Low • • • •    1.00 .98 .94 .89 .43 .63 .64
Intermediate • • • •    1.00 .99 .99 .98 .77 .89 .94
High • • • • • • • 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .93 .97 .99
, <.65; , .65–.79; •, >.79.
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success probabilities for the test pairs M1, M4, T1, and T3.
Second, for intermediate verbatim-trace level and low or intermediate gist-trace levels
(Table 10, rows 4 and 5) temporal-position effects were hypothesized. However, for low
gist-trace level the estimated probabilities only showed this effect on the first memory
test-pair but not on the last one. For intermediate gist-trace level a spatial-position effect
was active (in particular on the side where the sticks were longest).
Third, for intermediate verbatim-trace level and high gist-trace level a spatial-position
effect was hypothesized (Table 10, row 6). The estimated probabilities showed a spatial-
position effect only on one of the two end-anchors.
Finally, it was hypothesized that high verbatim-trace level and intermediate gist-trace
level produce high memory test-pair probabilities and low transitivity test-pair probabili-
S. Bouwmeester et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 41–74 67ties (Table 10, row 8). The estimated probabilities for the transitivity test-pairs were high
for the end-anchors thus indicating a spatial-position effect.
Discussion
Based on the estimated probability structures, the two abilities could be interpreted as
verbatim and gist abilities. At a detailed level observed performance agreed well with
hypothesized performance for OposOpres and OposDpres tasks but not as well for DposOpres
tasks.
Some relevant deviations from the expected probability patterns are the following.
Temporal-position effects were found only for the premises presented first instead of both
premises presented first and last. This result agreed with that of Berch (1979), who showed
that children’s short-term memory primacy effects usually are stronger than the recency
effects. Spatial-position effects in DposOpres tasks were found in particular on one side
of the ordering (containing the longest sticks) but not on both sides. This could be due
to a marking effect; that is, linguistic factors may have played a role in the end-anchoring.
During the premise presentation children had to touch the longest stick on the pc-screen,
and this may explain why their representation of the long end-anchor is better than that
of the short end-anchor (see Riley & Trabasso, 1974; Sternberg, 1980; Trabasso et al.,
1975).
An important result was that children with a high verbatim-ability level but a low gist-
ability level performed well on the memory test-pairs but only at chance level on the tran-
sitivity test-pairs. This finding disagrees with Trabasso’s linear ordering theory which
assumes that memory of the premises is sufficient to infer the transitive relationship. Thus,
we found that a high ability to remember premises is not enough to correctly infer a tran-
sitive relationship. These results agreed with the results found by Halford and Galloway
(1977, 1979) and Halford (1979).
Piaget’s theory assumes that memory of the premises is a prerequisite for using rules of
logic and inferring transitive relationships. Task format was not expected to influence the
use of rules of logic when the premises could be remembered. However, we found that
memory of the premises was not a prerequisite for inferring the transitive relationship
and that task type had a strong influence on the probability of inferring the transitive rela-
tionships correctly, even when the premises were remembered correctly. These results con-
tradict Piaget’s theory. It may be noted that Piaget’s initial aim was not to give a detailed
description of transitive reasoning; this renders a comparison between his theory and the
present study somewhat disputable.
The results showed that model A fitted poorest for task DposOpres in which the position
of the objects was disordered and the presentation ordered. Although the estimated and
expected probabilities differed in particular in size and not in direction, differences were
substantial. One possible explanation for this result is that task DposOpres differed more
than the other tasks from those used by Brainerd and Kingma (1984); these authors used
disordered presentation but not disordered position. Therefore, we could not rely on
earlier findings when formulating our expectations for this task.
Analysis section 3: relationship of age with verbatim and gist abilities
Based on Brainerd and Kingma (1984, 1985), Reyna and Brainerd (1990), and
Reyna (1992) we formulated expectations about the development of the verbatim and
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es completion at approximately five years of age. Gist ability develops at a slower pace
and is not expected to reach full development during childhood (Reyna & Brainerd,
1990; see also Dayton, 1998; Liben & Posnansky, 1977; Marx, 1985a, 1985b; Perner
& Mansbridge, 1983; Reyna, 1996; Stevenson, 1972). Therefore, we predicted a positive
non-linear relationship between age and both verbatim ability and gist ability. Linear,
quadratic and cubic regression curves were fitted to the data to explain the relation-
ships between age (independent variable) and verbatim and gist ability level (dependent
variables).
Results
Fig. 9 displays the scatterplots of age and verbatim ability, and age and gist ability. The
fit of the linear, quadratic and cubic regression curves did not differ significantly; thus, the
curvature of the hypothesized developmental relationships was not supported by the data.
The linear model for verbatim ability explained 8% of the variance and that for the gist
ability explained 20% .
Discussion
Brainerd and Kingma (1984) investigated the differences in performance between vari-
ous fixed-age groups, thus ignoring individual differences within age groups. Alternatively,
we used regression models to determine the influence of age on ability, and found a low
linear correlation between age and verbatim ability and a moderate linear correlation
between age and gist ability. Fuzzy trace theory assumes that for transitive reasoning tasks
verbatim ability does not improve much after age five; thus, the low correlation between
verbatim ability and age might be due to the restricted age range. For preschoolers, a
stronger relation might be expected.
Wohlwill (1973, pp. 26–28) and Kessen (1960) argued that chronological age is not a
useful variable in statements of functional relationships with behavior because age ignores
considerable individual differences in rates of developmental change. Thus, it may be more
appropriate to study development by distinguishing groups on the basis of their probabil-
ity to use verbatim and gist traces instead of fixed-age groups.Fig. 9. Scatterplots of verbatim and gist ability scores and age in months (the larger the bullets, the more data
points are on the same position).
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Main findings
Fuzzy trace theory was used to explain individual differences in transitive reasoning. A
model was set up in which verbatim and gist-ability levels governed the formation of
verbatim and gist traces, and these traces governed performance on memory and transitiv-
ity test-pairs. Age was hypothesized to be related to both abilities. A multilevel latent class
model was used to handle the dependencies between ability level and trace retrieval, and
between trace retrieval and performance on the test pairs. Fitting the model to the data led
to two conclusions. First, two abilities had to be distinguished and, second, on the basis of
estimated probability structures these abilities could be interpreted as verbatim and gist
abilities.
Comparison with earlier findings
Brainerd and Kingma (1984) assumed that both memory and transitivity test-pairs
are solved by means of gist traces and were able to show that the unitary-trace model
could well explain performance on memory and transitivity test-pairs. Our results
agreed with this finding: We also found that children having high gist ability indeed
were able to solve both memory and transitivity test-pairs using the appropriate pattern
information. For high gist-ability levels and intermediate and high verbatim-ability lev-
els, the unitary-trace model explains both performance on memory and transitivity test-
pairs. However, for low or intermediate gist-ability levels the verbatim trace has a
strong influence on performance on memory test-pairs, indicating that there is a chang-
ing orientation from the use of verbatim traces to both kinds of traces and, finally, to
gist traces. For tasks in which the position of the objects is not ordered, as in DposOpres
tasks, both high verbatim and gist-trace levels were required to infer the transitive
relationship.
Usefulness of the latent class model
The latent class model had several advantages. First, it enabled us to test detailed
hypotheses which made it possible to determine which aspects of fuzzy trace theory agreed
with observed data and which aspects disagreed. We found that the estimated probabilities
for the test-pairs of OposOpres tasks and OposDpres tasks in general agreed with the hypoth-
esized probabilities, but that for DposOpres tasks discrepancies were larger. Indeed, inequal-
ity relationships between probabilities were in the hypothesized direction but differences
were often greater than expected.
Second, the latent class model enabled us to analyze response patterns on task scores
and to predict response processes. Thus, individual differences could be taken into
account and latent groups in which children have the same probabilities to use verbatim
and gist traces could be identified from the data while probabilities between groups are
different. These groups provide an alternative for a priori fixed (age) groups. A more
reliable description of differences between these latent groups requires data from even
larger numbers of subjects and larger numbers of responses per subject than were used
here.
70 S. Bouwmeester et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 41–74Implications for the debate on developmental stages
The results of this study have implications for the discussion on developmental stages.
On the one hand even five-year old children may be able to retrieve high-level gist traces
and infer the complete ordering of a task. On the other hand, some twelve-year old children
may be more likely to retrieve the lowest trace level and thus do not recognize any ordering
in the task. Thus, it is not possible to distinguish clear-cut developmental stages in the
development of transitive reasoning (see also Bouwmeester & Sijtsma, in press). Because
we used a cross-sectional design, no conclusions could be drawn about the transition from
one probability distribution of trace levels to another probability distribution. A longitudi-
nal design is needed for this purpose. This would require an extra level in the multi-level
structure to model the dependencies within individual children’s data over time.
Appendix A
Let test pairs be indexed by k = 1, . . ., 7; tasks by i = 1, . . ., 12; and children by j =
1, . . .,N. Response variable Yijk = 1 when child j gives a correct response to test pair k
in task i, and Yijk = 0 otherwise. The scores of child j on task i are collected in the vector
Yij, and vector Yj denotes the scores of child j on all 12 tasks.
The multilevel latent class model we used contains two ordinal latent variables denoted
by Xij and Qij representing the verbatim and gist traces, respectively, for a particular task i.
These two mutually independent latent variables are assumed to have discrete realization
between 0 and 1, with equal distances between categories: With three classes per dimen-
sion, x = 0.0, 0.5, or 1.0, and q = 0.0, 0.5, or 1.0. This yields a latent class model with mul-
tiple latent variables that Magidson and Vermunt (2001) called a latent class factor model.
If we assume that the various tasks performed by a child are independent of one another,






P ðX ij ¼ xÞP ðQij ¼ qÞ
Y7
k¼1
P ðY ijkjX ij ¼ x;Qij ¼ qÞ: ð1Þ
This equation reveals the basic assumption of a latent clas model: The scores on the seven
test pairs are mutually independent given the latent verbatim and gist-trace levels of child j
at task i.
Because of the nesting of tasks within children, the standard assumption of independent
observations is not correct for our data. The multiple tasks performed by a child can, how-
ever, be assumed to be mutually independent given the child’s latent verbatim and gist
abilities. These two continuous latent variables, which are denoted by Wj and Vj, respec-
tively, with realization w and v, have the role of random effects in the models for Xij and Qij
(Vermunt, 2003). The abilities or random effects Wj and Vj modify the model for Yij
described in Eq. (1) as follows:









P ðY ijkjX ij ¼ x;Qij ¼ qÞ: ð2Þ
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the continuous latent abilities on the responses are assumed to be fully mediated by the
discrete latent trace levels.
The probability associated with all responses of an individual, denoted by P(Yj), is
obtained by taking the product of P(YijŒWj = w, Vj = v) over the 12 tasks and integrating






f ðW j ¼ wÞf ðV j ¼ vÞ
Y12
i¼1
PðYijjW j ¼ w; V j ¼ vÞ
" #
dwdv: ð3Þ
Note that P (Yij Œ Wj = w, Vj = v) has the form described in Eq. (2), and f(Wj = w) and
f(Vj = v) are standard normal univariate distributions.
The three types of model probabilities appearing in Eq. (2) – P(Xij = x ŒWj = w),
P(Qij = q ŒVj = v), and P(Yijk Œ Xij = x, Qij = q) – are parameterized as logit models.
The probability of a correct response of child j on test pair k of task i is restricted by a
standard binary logit model of the form
P ðY ijk ¼ 1j X ij ¼ x;Qij ¼ qÞ ¼
expðb0ki þ b1ki  xþ b2ki  qþ b3ki  x  qÞ
1þ expðb0ki þ b1ki  xþ b2ki  qþ b3ki  x  qÞ
; ð4Þ
where b0ki is an intercept, b1ki and b2ki are the main effects of verbatim-trace level and gist-
trace level, respectively, and b3ki is the interaction effect of verbatim and gist-trace levels.
The indices k and i indicate that these parameters differ across test pairs and tasks. This is,
however, not fully correct since the parameters were restricted to be equal for all four rep-
lications of the same task-type (e.g., b0k,i+3 = b0k,i). This implies that we have to estimate
only three sets of free b parameters.
The other two parts of the model, capturing the relative sizes of the verbatim and
gist-trace levels given the verbatim and gist-ability levels, are modeled as
P ðX ij ¼ xjW j ¼ wÞ ¼
expðc0x þ c1  x  wÞP
x expðc0x þ c1  x  wÞ
;
and
P ðQij ¼ qjV j ¼ vÞ ¼
expðc2q þ c3  q  vÞP
q expðc2q þ c3  q  vÞ
:
These are adjacent-category ordinal logit models similar to the ones used in partial-credit
models, which are item response models for ordinal items. The c parameters are assumed
to be equal across the 12 tasks.
The multilevel latent class models were estimated by means of maximum likelihood
using an adapted version of the EM algorithm (Vermunt, 2003, 2004). This procedure
is implemented in version 4.0 of Latent Gold (Vermunt & Magidson, 2005), a
Windows-based program for latent class analysis, that is available at www.
statisticalinnovations.com.References
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